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ABSTRACT 
144 children aged 5 to 12 years made initial predictions about the speeds of a heavy 
and a light ball rolling down a slope. They were then asked to consider how changing 
the incline height would impact the initial predictions. The findings illustrate a shift 
from rigid differentiation to more flexible knowledge structures. While perceptions 
changed with increasing age from light-as-faster to heavy-as-faster, younger children 
were also less likely to believe that any other incline steepness could conceivably lead 
to a different outcome. Older children, on the other hand, showed a heightened 
awareness of how changing incline heights could allow for alternative motion patterns. 
The study adds to current understanding of conceptual development. It expands on 
the debate between knowledge-in-pieces and knowledge-as-theory, concluding within 
its constrained scope that development of scientific knowledge about object motion 
possibly occurs in a transition from pieces to theory. Consequentially, the paper also 
considers implications for early science education. 
Keywords: commonsense theories of motion, conceptual development, conceptual 
change, science education 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When trying to interpret the physical world, mental modelling can assist in the reasoning process. Mental models 
act as prototypical representations of the world, often as a result of experiences with that world, and these 
representations allow the simulating of new events or of behaviours of new objects (Jonassen, 2003; Nersessian, 
2008, 2013). But what do the knowledge structures in these mental models that enable the prediction of future 
events look like? The current literature, at large, offers two views on this matter. In diSessa’s (2006, 2013) opinion, 
scientific knowledge exists in pieces. These are loosely connected to each other within unstructured conceptual 
networks. Relevant pieces and their connections are accessed depending on the reasoning demands of a particular 
task. The other key viewpoint considers that knowledge exists as theory (Vosniadou, 2007, 2013). Scientific 
conceptions exist within coherent belief structures underpinned by ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions. 
Recent research has attempted to evaluate the representations of knowledge in the particular development of 
children’s commonsense theories of motion (Hast, 2014; Hast & Howe, 2012, 2013a). There seems to be a fairly clear 
picture as far as horizontal and vertical motion are concerned, and that these two aspects are clearly differentiated 
in children’s reasoning. Regardless of age, children were shown to consistently believe that heavy objects fall faster 
than lighter ones, but that the lighter ones would roll faster along a horizontal surface than the heavy ones. 
Concurrently, the same children would make varying predictions about the same objects rolling down slopes – 
younger children assumed the light one to be faster, and with increasing age the predictions shifted towards a 
heavy-faster conception. A key question, as a result, was whether this shift was because of a third theoretical 
structure or changes in how children integrated information across the horizontal and vertical knowledge 
fragments. 
In relation to this question, diSessa (2006, 2013) has argued that knowledge fragments are an abstraction of 
individual experiences and predictions about events are, as a result, often seen as self-explanatory and only at best 
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systematic in merely a broader sense. In the context of motion this might be reflected in the common statement that 
heavy objects fall faster, or that light objects roll faster along horizontals – something that, on the surface of 
individual experiences, often seems to be true. On the other hand, Vosniadou’s (2007, 2013) framework theory 
approach might argue that object motion is explained through more coherent and consistent knowledge structures. 
Such structures, in the present context, would, for instance, elicit a common conceptual understanding of force as 
being the property of an object rather than a process. This would mean that a statement cannot be reduced to a light 
object rolling faster because it is the interaction of various variables such as surface or object texture that determines 
outcomes.  
As far as a scientifically accurate understanding of motion in the various dimensions is concerned, different 
variable constellations are necessary to appreciate. When falling, a ball’s mass and its acceleration due to gravity 
have to be considered, as well as – sometimes negligible – resistance of the medium through which it is falling. The 
ball will fall until some form of support is obtained. When rolling along horizontals, friction also needs to be 
incorporated. Different from fall, motion occurs even though support exists and a ball can stop rolling even if no 
obstacle is in its path. Motion down slopes is an integration of both of these, and the height or angle of incline can 
determine how much each plays a role. A knowledge-in-pieces view on this might suggest a differentiated 
understanding of fall and horizontal based on the particular requirements, and might associate motion down slopes 
with either of the two. A framework theory, on the other hand, would be more likely to show some understanding 
– accurate or not – of the interplay of all three, since the underpinning laws relate. 
Within the context of the theoretical discussion, some progress has been made. Hast (2016), for instance, 
concluded that children’s understanding of curvilinear downward motion is likely to be guided by knowledge-as-
pieces rather than knowledge-as-theory. However, the outcomes were not entirely conclusive and there was also 
acknowledgement of the possibility of an interaction of both pieces and theory (cf. Brown & Hammer, 2013). As a 
result, some progress has been provided, but not enough. There seemed to be indications that, within commonsense 
motion theory structures, representations of falling objects are distinct from representations of objects rolling along 
horizontals, and that both are taken into consideration when reasoning about objects rolling down inclines. Yet no 
clarity could be provided on how with increasing age the knowledge representations change in their structure, only 
in content. However, if knowledge in the context of commonsense theories of motion does exist in pieces, then over 
time a reinforcement of the connections between pieces may result in more systematic forms of reasoning (Wagner, 
2010). Further to this, within the particular processes of fragmentation and integration of knowledge, the 
magnitudes of influence of individual pieces may change over time (Clark & Linn, 2013). 
To attempt to examine this issue, the present study evaluated the particular role of incline height in the 
development of children’s commonsense theories of motion. Previous work has already evaluated children’s 
understanding of the impact that incline changes have on the distance objects travel after rolling down and leaving 
the slope (Ferretti, Butterfield, Cahn, & Kerkman, 1985; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) or the impact of changes on object 
speed along the slope (Hast & Howe, 2013a; Howe, Tolmie, & Rodgers, 1992). The study adds to this by looking at 
how children’s predictions of incline height changes link to knowledge-in-pieces or knowledge-as-theory. 
Specifically, it examines the rigidity and fluidity of children’s expectations of heavy and light objects rolling down 
slopes. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from state primary schools located in the Greater London area. A total sample of 
144 children (73 boys, 71 girls) aged 5 to 12 (M = 8.50 years) was selected. An equal number of children with similar 
average age and distributions took part in each of the conditions outlined below. 
Contribution of this paper to the literature 
• The study highlights the development of commonsense theories of motion throughout middle childhood, 
with specific interest in differentiation and integration of horizontal and vertical dimensions in the context 
of motion down inclines. 
• The study makes claim that throughout middle childhood understanding of object motion down inclines 
develops from rigid differentiated understanding towards fluid integrated conception. 
• The study argues against delineation between views of knowledge-in-pieces and knowledge-as-theory but 
instead – in the context of commonsense theories of motion – for a transition from the former to the latter. 
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Design and Materials 
A metal frame of 125 cm height was fixed to a wooden base of 70 cm length and 30 cm width. Attached to the 
metal frame was a plastic channel of 100 cm length, 5 cm height and 10.5 cm width (see Figure 1). The channel was 
attached in such a way that it could be moved along the metal frame to modify the height of its incline. The height 
ranged from practically horizontal at 5 cm height to practically vertical at 99 cm height. A white table tennis ball (4 
cm diameter, 3 g) and a dark glass marble (4 cm diameter, 75 g) were used as test balls. In addition, a squash ball 
similar in size to the two test balls was used as a practice ball. To examine the particular findings presented in Hast 
and Howe’s (2013a) research, the channel’s starting height was set at 15 cm (Condition 1) or at 30 cm (Condition 2). 
Procedure 
The apparatus was set up in a quiet but open area in each of the participating schools. Children were worked 
with individually. After invitation to the area, each child was told by the researcher that they would be working on 
a science experiment. The child was first familiarised with the apparatus, including how the channel’s height could 
be adjusted. The researcher then presented the practice ball and asked the child to explain what would happen if 
the ball were let go from the top of the channel. The practice ball was then released down the channel. If children 
had initially given an incorrect explanation or one that did not sufficiently explain the process, they were asked to 
explain again what would happen if the ball were let go. 
The practice ball was then removed and the researcher presented the two test balls. Both balls were given to the 
child who was then asked to state whether one ball would be faster or whether they would be as fast as each other 
if released down the channel. If one ball was predicted to be faster than the other, the child was asked to give 
reasons for this. The child was then further asked whether the incline could be adjusted in such a way that the two 
balls would be as fast as each other. If this was deemed to be the case the child was asked to adjust the channel to 
that position. If the child had initially stated that the two balls would be as fast as each other, the child was asked 
whether there was a height when one of the balls would be faster than the other. If so, the child was invited to 
indicate this height as well as explain which of the two balls would then be faster and why. Incline heights were 
recorded by the researcher after completion of the task. The task took around 10 minutes. 
Data Analysis 
All children passed the control question about the practice ball so all data were included for analysis. Children 
were first given a score of 1 according to which prediction was made (heavy-faster, light-faster, or same speed). 
Children were then given a score of 1 or 0 according to whether they thought the incline height could be changed 
or not. Where they had been invited to adjust the incline, the new height was recorded in cm. Comparisons between 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of apparatus setup 
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gender and condition were also carried out but showed no significant differences and are therefore not discussed 
further. All data reported below were analysed using SPSS Statistics 21. 
RESULTS 
Children varied significantly in their predictions of whether the heavy ball or the light ball would be faster, or 
whether the two balls would have the same speed, χ2(2, 144) = 68.67, p < 0.001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
showed that a significantly larger proportion of children predicted that the light ball would be faster in comparison 
to those who thought the heavy ball would be faster, z = 3, p < 0.02, r = 0.24, which in turn was predicted 
significantly more often than same speed, z = 5, p < 0.001, r = 0.69. No significant differences were noted between 
the two conditions, suggesting the initial incline height did not have any particular impact on children’s reasoning. 
Looking at age related changes (see Figure 2), mean age varied significantly across prediction types, H(2) = 30.83, 
p < 0.001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that children who predicted the heavy ball to be faster (M = 9.64 
years, SD = 1.66) were, on average, significantly older than those who predicted the light ball to be faster (M = 7.74 
years, SD = 1.67), z = 6, p < 0.001, r = 0.47. This is comparable to the shift in predictions across age that noted in 
previous research, where younger children were more likely to associate lightness with faster motion down inclines 
but with increasing age were more likely to associate it with heaviness (e.g. Hast, 2014; Hast & Howe, 2013a, 2017). 
Only four children thought that the two speeds would be the same from the beginning, and that the two balls’ 
speeds would not diverge through any subsequent incline height changes. All remaining children (N = 140) 
assumed that speeds for the two balls would be different. Where this was the case, approximately equal numbers 
of children believed that the incline could (N = 64) and that it could not (N = 76) be adjusted so that the two balls 
would, at some point, have the same speed. However, these two groups differed according to which of the two 
balls had been predicted to be faster. Those children who had predicted that the light ball would be faster were 
significantly more likely than those who had predicted that the heavy ball would be faster to assume that the incline 
could be changed to achieve same speeds, z = 5, p < 0.001, r = 0.67. The two groups also differed in their mean age. 
Those children who predicted that same speed could be achieved were, on average, significantly younger (M = 7.95 
years, SD = 1.73) than those who thought it was not possible (M = 8.97 years, SD = 1.94), z = 3, p < 0.05, r = 0.27. 
This suggests that, alongside the shift from light-as-faster to heavy-as-faster, with increasing age there is increasing 
stability in such predictions. 
Where an incline change was deemed possible to achieve same speeds for the two balls, children’s height 
adjustments showed no significant difference in average height between the two starting height conditions. 
However, there was a significant difference between the adjusted incline height for children who had initially 
predicted the light ball to be faster (M = 61.3 cm) and the height for those who had predicted the heavy ball to be 
faster (M = 16.0 cm), z = 8, p < 0.001, r = 0.73. For those children who had made an initial heavy-faster prediction, 
there was no significant correlation between age and height. On the other hand, for those children who had 
predicted the light ball to be faster, there was a strong significant negative correlation between the two variables, r 
= -0.67, p < 0.001, indicating that the height at which the two balls were considered to have the same speed decreased 
with increasing age (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2. Box plots showing age distributions for predicted outcomes 
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DISCUSSION 
The present findings, in sum, indicate that in the context of processing information about object motion down 
inclines, children appear to develop from a rigid prediction style towards a more fluid understanding. For younger 
children, lightness seems to be of advantage as far as faster speed is concerned. With increasing age, heaviness is 
seen as more crucial in this regard. In the first instance, this is in agreement with other studies demonstrating the 
same shift in perceptions (Hast, 2014; Hast & Howe, 2013a, 2017). But not only does the vertical element of inclines 
seem to increasingly gain salience over the horizontal element, the predictions also appear to be increasingly 
embedded in more flexible knowledge structures. First, younger children were less likely to consider that different 
incline heights could lead to different outcomes. Older children, on the other hand appeared to see this as possible. 
And second, with increasing age the point of same speed came closer to a 45 degree angle; arguably the point where 
horizontality and verticality should be given equal consideration in evaluation motion down inclines. 
Previous work has shown that even at younger ages, children appropriately understand how changing an 
incline’s height can fundamentally impact a single object’s speed (Ferretti et al., 1985; Hast & Howe, 2013a; Howe 
et al., 1992; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), and even that objects rolling down slopes should generally accelerate as in fall, 
rather than decelerate as along horizontals (Hast & Howe, 2013b). So the issue arising in the present study does not 
appear to be with comprehending the concept of motion down slopes per se. However, the more complex 
interaction of height changes and of consideration of weight of two different objects seems to be more challenging. 
As a result, initial conceptions seem to follow a pattern of extremes. Either the light ball is seen as the faster one at 
all times regardless of incline steepness, or if a point of same speed is seen to exist then it is either at a very shallow 
or a very steep level, as seen in Figure 3. It is plausible that this is supportive of a lack of ability to systematically 
incorporate multiple variables, and that this competency only emerges at some point during middle childhood (cf. 
Baroody, Lai, Li, & Baroody, 2009; Hast, 2014; Howe, Nunes, & Bryant, 2010; Wilkening, 1981). 
The insight afforded by the present research can also be considered in the wider context of scientific theory 
formation. To take sides between the two main perspectives of knowledge in pieces (diSessa, 2006, 2013) and 
knowledge as theory (Vosniadou, 2007, 2013) is a formidable task based on such a small study. However, both are 
seen as possible explanations here. The outcomes evident in the younger children seem to lean towards diSessa’s 
interpretations of conceptualisation. Knowledge about motion down slopes is not fully consolidated within a 
broader theoretical construct and so children are instead drawing on fragmented knowledge where horizontality 
as the visible element plays a more salient role (cf. Mou, Zhu, & Chen, 2015). As a result, perceptions of light-as-
faster are more prevalent and persistent, as might be expected from their predictions about motion along 
horizontals (Hast, 2014; Hast & Howe, 2012, 2013a; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). On the other hand, older children’s 
predictions show a more intricate consideration of different pieces of information, quite possibly within more 
complex theoretical structures akin to Vosniadou’s interpretation. In fact, it appears to correspond with the notion 
of theoretical coherence as result of hybridisation from two different meanings (cf. Ioannides & Vosinadou, 2002). 
Taken as a whole, then, fragmented ideas are interlinked and coordinated within larger configurations of 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of adjusted incline heights by age and initial speed predictions 
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knowledge and the reinforcement of these connections over time results in more systematic forms of reasoning 
(Wagner, 2010). 
What, then, does this mean for science education in practice? The findings strengthen previous calls to organise 
science curricula in such a way that children first learn the differentiation between horizontal and vertical motion, 
and then the integration of these two dimensions in understanding slopes (Hast, 2016; Hast & Howe, 2012, 2013a). 
The second step would also provide opportunities to reinforce previously learnt materials about object motion in 
the individual dimensions by returning to them and then evaluating not their distinction but how they can also 
interact; an approach much akin to Bruner’s (1960) spiral curriculum. Importantly, these need to occur at age levels 
where children begin to show scientifically inadequate conceptions but are still open to conceptual change of the 
individual knowledge pieces before fuller theoretical constructs emerge. The present study cannot provide 
sufficient rationale for such organisation but indicates that throughout the primary school age range, the individual 
dimensions should be considered at the earlier end and the interaction at a later point in time. 
This study only provides a small window into the topic, particularly constrained by its quantitative approach. 
As it does not include qualitative data the scope of insight is limited, particularly on the subjective interpretation 
of motion events as well as the extent to which knowledge is present. In particular, there may be variables beyond 
object weight that play a role in the outcomes – although weight is a predominant variable in children’s judgement 
(cf. Hast & Howe, 2012) and other variables such as size and shape were kept the same between the two balls, 
because questioning did not include any detailed discussions into why predictions were made the way they were. 
Despite being able to deduce these from other studies (e.g. Hast & Howe, 2013a), further research would 
nonetheless do well to examine the qualitative nature of children’s scientific reasoning. Similarly, the study limits 
itself to only two weights. A wider range of weights and perhaps also combinations with other variables, such as 
small but heavy or large but light, would also provide a fuller picture around the development of commonsense 
theories of motion throughout childhood. 
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